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AS GREECE GOES, SO GOES THE E.U.: DEFENDING EUROPE WITH A 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK 
Elizabeth H. Dahill* 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The European sovereign debt crisis has devolved into a complex 
whack-a-mole game, confounding expert policymakers, global financial 
analysts, and pundits. Each day brings new headlines as the crisis 
continues to evolve with no end in sight. Every new development sends a 
shockwave through the global financial markets and spreads uncertainty 
from large international financial institutions down to average working 
men and women. In response to this volatility, European policymakers 
gathered in October 2011 at the Euro Summit.
1
 The meeting concluded 
months of posturing and set the framework for a precarious 
compromise—the Euro Summit Statement (the Statement): a mix of 
bailouts, austerity measures, and haircuts for the banks. Then, in 
December, the Euro Summit moved forward with its promises under the 
Statement and signed an intergovernmental treaty. The treaty set the 
terms for “structural reforms and fiscal consolidation” in order to 
enhance E.U. fiscal “monitoring and [to correct] macroeconomic 
imbalances.”2  
However, this ad hoc solution, the Statement, and the treaty reform 
steps, have done little to quell fears.
3
 Instead, Europe is faced with a new 
set of questions: How long can these European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) bailout funds last?
 
What role will the non-Eurozone 
European Union (E.U.) member states
4
 play in the current bailout and 
future fiscal reforms? Can Greece be saved and will Europe be able to 
                                                          
*   Staff Attorney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP. I am grateful for comments from Robert Dremluk, 
Esq., Professor Edward Janger of Brooklyn Law School and the participants in the Brooklyn Law 
School Bankruptcy and Commercial Law Colloquium. 
1 Euro Summit Statement, Euro Summit (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125644.pdf. 
2 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126714.pdf [hereinafter Conclusions].  
3 See Sudeep Reddy, Geithner Presses Europe for Debt Solution, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204770404577082512791508098.html; Patrick 
Donahue, Greek Debt Talks Risk Derailing EU Summit, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 30, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-01-29/greek-debt-talks-risk derailing-eu-summit/ (“The 
fact we’re still at the beginning of 2012 talking about Greece is a sign this problem hasn’t been dealt 
with.” (quoting George Osborne, U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer)). 
4 The Eurozone is composed of seventeen out of twenty-seven member states of the European 
Union who have adopted the euro as their common currency. Introduction, EUR. CENTRAL BANK, 
http://www.ecb.int/euro/intro/html/index.en.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
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regroup to save Spain, Italy, and potentially, Portugal—or will the 
seventeen nations that joined together to adopt one common currency 
dissolve and end the euro experiment?
5
 Now, the world waits as the 
Eurozone member states, and the greater E.U., attempt to address these 
concerns and continue to battle this evolving debt beast.
6
  This 
uncertainty is worrisome in an increasingly inter-connected financial 
world.
7
 Therefore, to respond to this crisis and likely, future crises, a 
clear framework to efficiently and effectively restructure sovereign debt 
is necessary.  
The creation of a European framework can accomplish the goal of 
restructuring sovereign debt efficiently and effectively.
8
 The framework 
must provide “adequate incentives to ensure the timely and orderly 
restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debts.”9 The need for such a 
framework is not a recent development.
10
 Sovereign insolvency and the 
need for a restructuring mechanism are issues that have continually faced 
sovereign nations and sovereign debt purchasers. Therefore, sovereign 
debt scholars and institutional entities have previously proposed 
mechanisms to respond to these sovereign debt crises, including: (1) the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM) and (2) the Collective Action Clauses (CAC). For 
the time being, both of these proposals remain fixtures of academic 
discussion and debate. The IMF formally removed the SDRM from 
consideration, and CACs, while common components in sovereign bond 
contacts, have never been used to implement a full-scale restructuring.
11
 
Therefore, these proposals, in addition to the Statement, provide the 
foundation from which to frame a new proposal: the creation of a 
European Debt Restructuring Framework (EDRF).
12
 
                                                          
5 Liz Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/business/global/banks-fear-breakup-of-the-euro-zone 
.html?_r=1&hp [hereinafter Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the Euro]; see 
Donahue, supra note 3. 
6 While not all E.U. member states have agreed to adopt the euro, all E.U. member states are 
vulnerable to uncertainty in the euro and have an interest in rebuilding fiscal security in Europe. See 
FRANÇOIS GIANVITI ET AL., A EUROPEAN MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS RESOLUTION: 
A PROPOSAL 21–23 (Andrew Fielding ed., 2010) [hereinafter GIANVITI]. 
7 GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that the ad hoc solutions are incomplete and fail to 
provide a framework to address “future debt crises in the euro area”). 
8 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at vi (“As French XVIIth-century churchman and occasional 
conspirator Cardinal de Retz used to say, ‘one leaves the realm of ambiguity at one’s peril.’”). 
9 ANNE O. KRUEGER, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING v (2002), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf. 
10 Id. 
11 See Part II, A & B infra. But see Landon Thomas Jr., Next Time, Green May Need New 
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/business/global/greece-
debt-restructuring-deal-private-lenders.html?hp=&pagewanted=print [hereinafter Thomas, Greece 
May Need New Tactics] (noting the Greek’s recent use of collective action clauses to force creditors 
to support a new debt relief plan). 
12 In order to address the full scope of a sovereign’s debt burden, a restructuring, not a 
rescheduling, is required. In a rescheduling parties agree to amend the “timetable of repayments 
without changing their present value.” GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 4 n.1. Whereas a restructuring 
involves: 
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In response to the growing sovereign debt crisis, E.U. policymakers 
should revive the SDRM, addressing the problems that led to its failure 
and adapting its successful elements, to create the EDRF. The IMF’s 
premier international economists worked to develop the SDRM.
13
 Even 
though the SDRM ultimately failed to gain international support, the 
mechanism provides a useful foundation for drafters writing a new 
framework tailored to the E.U.’s needs. This framework would allow a 
sovereign-debtor and its creditors to initiate and conduct negotiations for 
orderly debt restructuring and the efficient administration of the debtor 
and creditor interests.
14
 In addition, it would alleviate the growing burden 
on debtor nations, while also protecting (or at least addressing) the other 
E.U. member states and European nationals’ interests.  
Part II will outline the history of sovereign debt and its reoccurring 
crises and discuss previous proposals to curb these crises, specifically the 
SDRM and CACs. Part III will address the current crisis in Europe, most 
specifically, the debt crisis in Greece and the Euro Summit’s ad hoc 
response. Part IV will argue for the creation of a new restructuring 
framework, EDRF, allowing for the orderly and efficient restructuring of 
sovereign debt. Finally, Part V will address potential criticisms of the 
EDRF and argue that despite these concerns, the EDRF is the most 
efficient and effective response to sovereign debt restructuring because it 
can protect the interests of the sovereign-debtor, its creditors, and its 
citizens.  
II.   A HISTORY OF CRISIS & FAILED SOLUTIONS 
Countries issue sovereign bonds in order to raise capital. The terms of 
the bond contract define the rights and obligations of the bond issuer (the 
sovereign nation) and the bond purchaser (the creditor).
15
 If a country 
becomes overleveraged and undercapitalized, it may be either unwilling 
or unable to continue payment to bondholding creditors. When 
sovereigns default on this contractual agreement, a sovereign debt crisis 
may ensue.
16
  
                                                                                                                                  
a combination of fiscal adjustments by the defaulting government on the 
one hand and, on the other, cutting the amount of debt outstanding, prolonging 
the maturity of the remaining debt and reducing the interest paid on it. Its 
main purpose is to return the debtor-country back to a state of sustainable 
public finances. At the same time, it aims at a fair distribution of the cost of 
restructuring between the borrower and the creditors.  
Id. at 10. 
13 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at v. 
14 See, e.g., GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 4. 
15 MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: 
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (forthcoming Dec. 2012). 
16 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS. STUDY GROUP, CGFS 
PAPERS NO. 43: THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RISK ON BANK FUNDING CONDITIONS 1–2 
(2011). 
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Sovereign debt crises have occurred more frequently in the past few 
decades. In the 1980s, Mexico was the harbinger of a debt crisis that 
spread throughout Latin America.
17
 In the 1990s, “excessive 
indebtedness fuel[ed] excessive consumption,” leading to a crisis in East 
Asia.
18
 Most recently, Argentina, Ecuador, Pakistan, Ukraine, and 
Uruguay have all faced economic crises requiring them to restructure 
their sovereign bonds.
19
  
In response to these crises, sovereign debt scholars and institutions, 
such as the IMF, decided to develop a framework for the orderly 
restructuring of sovereign debt.
20
 The two solutions that emerged from 
this scholarship are the SDRM and CAC proposals. Neither proposal has 
been subsequently adopted—In 2003, the IMF formally removed SDRM 
from consideration, while CACs are now a common clause in bond 
contracts, but have never been used collectively to affect a full-scale 
restructuring.
21
 While these proposals are not adequate solutions, they 
provide a useful foundation for the development of a new European 
framework for restructuring sovereign debt.  
A.  The IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
After the sovereign debt crises in Latin America, when the IMF was 
forced to assume the role of “the lender of last resort,”22 a team of 
economists at the IMF, led by Anne O. Krueger, drafted the SDRM.
23
 
The central goal was to “facilitate the orderly, predictable and rapid 
restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt, while protecting asset 
                                                          
17 Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Greek Debt: The Endgame Scenarios, 10 Duke Law 
Faculty Scholarship, Paper No. 2380 (Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://scholarship. 
law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2380 (“In August of 1982, Mexico was forced to declare a 
moratorium on the repayment of its external debt owed to commercial banks. Over the course of the 
next two years, more than twenty other countries followed suit—it later came to be called “the 
global debt crisis” of the 1980s.”); Ross P. Buckley, The Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Come, 43 INT’L LAW. 1190, 1194–96 (noting the “severe crisis” in Argentina).  
18 Buckley, supra note 17, at 1194 (noting the East Asia crisis from 1996 through 1998 spread 
across Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines); see also Lee C. Buchheit, A 
Quarter Century of Sovereign Debt Management: An Overview, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 637, 639 (2004) 
[hereinafter Buchheit, An Overview] (“Since 1982, not a single year has passed without sovereign 
debt issues occupying a prominent place in the headlines . . . .The time has now come when some of 
those borrowers will have to master the technique of restructuring those securities.”). 
19 See Buchheit, An Overview, supra note 18, at 638. 
20 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 39 (“Sovereigns with unsustainable debts often wait too long 
before they seek a restructuring, leaving both their citizens and their creditors worse off. And when 
sovereigns finally do opt for restructuring, the process is more protracted than it needs to be and less 
predictable than creditors would like.”). 
21 See infra notes 35, 48–62. 
22 See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the Harvard Center for International Development, 
Remarks delivered at a conference: The International Lender of Last Resort: What are the 
Alternatives?, 181, available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/Sachs%20Writing 
/1999/FedResBankofBoston_InternationalLenderofLastResort_June1999.pdf (last visited Oct.29, 
2012). 
23 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at v, 4. 
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values and creditors’ rights.”24 Therefore, SDRM allows a sovereign to 
exercise an option to restructure its debt when “no feasible set of 
sustainable macroeconomic policies would enable the debtor to resolve 
the immediate crisis and restore medium-term viability.”25 The SDRM 
mechanism for restructuring debt can be initiated only by the sovereign; 
the IMF and/or creditors cannot impose a sovereign’s debt restructuring 
under the SDRM.
26
 
Three main components defined the SDRM plan: 
Majority Restructuring: The restructuring plan 
could be approved by a vote of a “supermajority of 
creditors” whose vote would bind all creditors.27 Here, 
the goal was to expedite the plan approval process and 
eliminate “distributive litigation.”28 
Protect creditor interests with “adequate 
assurances”29: For example, the sovereign could not 
make payments to non-priority creditors or the sovereign 
would agree to “conduct policies in a fashion that 
preserves asset values.”30 In order to regulate this 
provision, certain transparency requirements would be 
established.
31
 
Priority Financing: Creditors would be ranked in 
seniority order, and creditors who provide fresh capital 
to the sovereign would be awarded most-senior status.
32
 
This would allow the sovereign to continue operating as 
a sovereign entity.
33
 
Combining all three principles, the SDRM would have provided a 
sovereign with the opportunity to restructure its debt while also 
balancing creditors’ interests. Protections, such as the adequate 
assurances and priority financing, incentivized creditors to participate in 
the restructuring.
34
 Through the exercise of SDRM, the sovereign-debtor 
and its creditors could negotiate a restructuring plan allowing the 
                                                          
24 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 39; Fail safe: What do German calls for an orderly sovereign-
default scheme mean in practice?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.economist.com/ 
node/17414142. 
25 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 4. 
26 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 4. 
27 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 14–15. 
28 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 14–15; see also A Factsheet: Proposals for Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF] (Jan. 2003), http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm [hereinafter IMF, Factsheet].  
29 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 16–17. 
30 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 16–17. 
31 IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28. 
32 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 17. 
33 IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28. 
34  To the extent creditors’ rights are not sufficiently protected then “[a] dispute resolution 
forum would be established to resolve disputes that may arise during the voting process or when 
claims are being verified.” IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28. 
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sovereign to continue to function as a nation while also paying off its 
debts. 
Despite the best efforts of Anne Krueger and the IMF, the SDRM 
failed to gain sufficient international support and the proposal was 
formally removed from consideration.
35
 Investors, who may have been 
creditors under this structure, feared the SDRM would reduce their 
potential payoffs from indebted sovereigns
36
 and would allow for “ex 
post facto modification of their contractual rights under outstanding 
bonds.”37 This was considered an unreasonable imposition on a creditor’s 
right to repayment under the sovereign bond contract. In addition, 
creditors ran the risk that the SDRM may “lead to less demand for their 
funds and higher risks for funds they provide.”38 On the other hand, 
sovereigns feared that the SDRM would “raise the price of credit due to 
the increased ease of restructuring and the corresponding decrease in 
bailouts.”39 Additionally, nations feared the SDRM would interfere with 
a nation’s right of absolute sovereignty in general, and its sovereign 
immunity in particular.
40
 As a result of these concerns, the SDRM was 
quick to attract opponents and slow to garner support. Finally, at the 
spring 2003 IMF meeting, the IMF’s governing body decided to drop the 
SDRM from future consideration.
41
 
B.  Collective Action Clauses 
The proposed use of CACs for restructuring debt arose as bond-
issuing sovereigns, specifically, the Group of Ten,
42
 responded to 
SDRM.
43
 A CAC is a clause that is included in the bond contract to allow 
a set percentage of creditors, usually at least a majority, to bind a 
minority of dissenters to a restructuring agreement.
44
 A CAC can 
“facilitate bond restructurings by lowering the threshold for agreement to 
a restructuring by bondholders from unanimity to an agreed-upon percent 
                                                          
35 Buckley, supra note 17, at 1213; see also GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 19. 
36 Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign-debtors, HARVARD LAW (9/3/2003 1:44 
PM), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/research/10scott.pdf; see also Sergio J. 
Galvis & Angel L. Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead, 35 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 715 (2004). 
37 Galvis & Saad, supra note 36, at 715. 
38 Scott, supra note 36, at 50. 
39 Id.; Robert Gray, Collective Action Clauses: Theory and Practice, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 693, 
697–98 (2004). This is an especially large concern for developing nations, who face a higher risk of 
default, and yet are most in need of the financial assistance provided by issuing sovereign bonds. See 
GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 19. 
40 Buckley, supra note 17, at 1213 (citing John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A 
U.S. Perspective (Apr. 2, 2002) (“It appears that the United States opposed the SDRM partly 
because it represented an expansion of IMF powers . . . ”)); Gray, supra note 39, at 694–95. 
41 Buckley, supra note 17, at 1213. 
42 The Group of Ten includes Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, which “consult and 
co-operate on economic, monetary and financial matters.” G10, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/list/g10publications/index.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2011). 
43 See Gray, supra note 39, at 695. 
44 See Gray, supra note 39, at 695–96. 
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super-majority rule.”45 The threshold percentage of creditors to establish 
consent is set by the terms of each particular CAC.
46
 When creditors 
reach the threshold, a restructuring can occur.
47
 The CAC’s goal is to 
ensure that the bargaining tactics of a minority group of holdouts does 
not indefinitely frustrate negotiations.
48
 These clauses had been included 
in English law bonds since the nineteenth century.
49
  However, CACs 
only arose in bonds governed by New York law in response to the 
SDRM.
50
 Proponents of this contractual solution argued that CACs 
provided the same restructuring relief without the intrusive SDRM 
provisions, in particular the requirement of IMF oversight.
51
 Opponents 
argued that including a CAC would send a negative signal to investors.
52
 
In 2003, however, Mexico issued the first CAC in a New York bond 
without alarming investors.
53
 This successful CAC experiment opened 
the door for the use of CACs in future bond issuances. As a result, CACs 
are now common terms in the majority of sovereign bond issuances—
governed by either English or New York law.
54
 
Even though CACs are now commonplace, the power of the CAC as 
a restructuring mechanism is limited. Each CAC defines the ability to 
renegotiate the terms of the bond contract for its particular issuance. The 
voting majority of creditors, as defined by the CAC, can only agree to a 
restructuring that would be binding on all holders of that issue.
55
 In the 
event that a sovereign must engage in a large restructuring of all 
sovereign debt bonds, the “CAC approach would require separate 
decisions from holders of each individual bond issue.”56 The nation is 
faced with an aggregation problem, whereby a nation having sold many 
bonds through many different issuances, must invoke the CAC in each 
                                                          
45 Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of 
a Bankruptcy Regime, (2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/ 
wp07192.pdf. 
46 GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G–10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 2 
(2002) [hereinafter G-10 REPORT], http://www.imf.org/external/np/g10/2002/cc.pdf (for bonds 
issued under English law the qualified majority is typically set at 75% of bondholders). 
47 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 36. 
48 G-10 REPORT, supra note 46, at 4 (asserting that the majority provision will reduce the risk 
that an “organized minority” will “hold up the process that a reasonable majority support[]”); Galvis 
& Saad, supra note 36, 714–15. 
49 Gray, supra note 39, at 695; see Elmar B. Kock, Collective Action Clauses: The Way 
Forward, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 667 (2004). 
50 Gray, supra note 39, at 695 (adopting CACs in the New York bonds required “convincing 
the U.S. investor community that the use of CACs did not represent a threat to their interests.”).  
51 Gray, supra note 39, at 695. 
52 Gray, supra note 39, at 695. 
53 Gray, supra note 39, at 698 (the first “New York-law, SEC-registered bond to include 
CACs” was issued by Mexico in February 2003. Mexico “had previously expressed its skepticism 
about . . .  adopting CACs. This suggested to the market that its move was indeed a measure of its 
concern with the threat of the SDRM alternative to its access to capital.”); see also Galvis & Saad, 
supra note 36, at 715–16 (“Mexico’s bonds incorporate . . . a ‘majority amendment’ clause 
permitting holders of seventy-five percent or more of the total outstanding principal amount of the 
bonds to amend ‘reserve matters,’ which include basic payment terms . . . .”). 
54 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 36; see also Galvis & Saad, supra note 36, at 717–18. 
55 G-10 REPORT, supra note 46, at 3. 
56 IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28. 
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issuance and negotiate with each group of creditors separately.
57
 As a 
result, the CAC’s usefulness on a large-scale is questionable.58 In 
addition, unlike the SDRM, “[c]reditors of issues not accepting a 
restructuring offer would have the right to pursue their interests in the 
courts of the country/state under whose laws the debt instruments were 
issued.”59 While creditors are limited in their enforcement options 
against sovereign-debtors, the absence of an aggregate action provision 
among all CACs,
60
 or an automatic stay, leaves the sovereign without 
any protection in the event creditor litigation is successfully executed.
61
   
For practical purposes, the SDRM and CAC approaches remain 
“thought experiments” in the context of a full-scale sovereign debt 
restructuring rather than an applicable policy.
62
 Not only did the IMF 
remove the SDRM from consideration, but Europe also responded to the 
present crisis by negotiating its own ad hoc response. While the 
policymakers are certainly experts in the field, informed about both 
proposals, neither proposal was formally invoked in the Statement or the 
Treaty. As the European sovereign debt crisis highlights, the absence of a 
clear framework for restructuring leads to greater uncertainty, which 
fuels the crisis further. 
III.   ENTERING CRISIS MODE: THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
A.  Sovereign Nations on the Brink 
Over the last three years, the E.U. member states have approached 
and receded from the precipice of a massive default.
63
 While Greece and 
Italy are the “crises de jour,”64 these are only two nations in the domino 
                                                          
57 See, e.g., GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 15. 
58 David A. Skeel, Review Essay, Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 
417, 422 (2003) (“Majority voting provisions may be all the sovereign needs to effect a restructuring 
if it has only issued one or two classes of bonds. But the voting strategy is much less attractive if the 
sovereign’s borrowings are more elaborate.”). 
59 IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28. 
60 For more information on aggregate reforms see Galvis & Saad, supra note 36, at 727. 
61 Skeel, supra note 58, at 423–24. 
62  Skeel, supra note 58, at 424 (arguing that the contractual approach is more appropriately 
defined as a thought experiment. Therefore, “we really do need a sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanism if we are serious about addressing the sovereign debt crisis.”). 
63 Landon Thomas, As Greece Struggles the World Imagines a Default, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/business/global/as-greece-struggles-the-world-imagines-
a-default.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter Thomas, As Greece Struggles]; Steven Erlanger & 
Stephen Castle, Europe Agrees to Basics of Plan to Resolve Euro Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/world/europe/german-vote-backs-bailout-fund-as-rifts-remain-
in-talks.html [hereinafter Erlanger & Castle, Europe Agrees to Basics of Plan]. 
64 Times Topics: Global Recession, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ 
timestopics/subjects/e/european_sovereign_debt_crisis/index.html?ref=global (last updated Feb. 13, 
2012) [hereinafter Global Recession] (“The debt crisis first surfaced in Greece in October 2009, 
when . . . Prime Minister George A. Papandreou announced that his predecessor had disguised the 
size of the country’s ballooning deficit . . . . Greece took advantage of this easy money to drive up 
borrowing by the country’s consumers and its government, which built up $400 billion in debt.”); 
Thomas, As Greece Struggles, supra note 63; Cullen Roche, Five Possible Outcomes for the Euro 
Crisis, BUS. INSIDER Sept. 2011. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW      VOLUME 9 
9 
 
line of highly leveraged and nearly insolvent European nations—which 
also include Ireland, Spain,
 
and Portugal.
65
 These nations, already known 
as the Eurozone’s “weakest economies,”66 ignored the debt limits set by 
the Stability and Growth Pact
 67
 and engaged in practices that led to 
“enormous” and likely insurmountable, debt loads.68 The growing crisis 
sparked “[a] series of negotiations, bailouts and austerity packages,” but 
these measures “failed to stop the slide of investor confidence or to 
restore the growth needed to give struggling countries a way out of their 
debt traps.”69 
As the policymakers “flail[ed] in their efforts to come up with a big 
plan, fast, to get to grips with the region's debt crisis,”70 the world 
watched in increasing consternation.
71
 Nationals demonstrated in public 
plazas across Europe;
72
 leading governments were voted out of office—
mainly in response to the harsh and unprecedented austerity measures;
73
 
and markets reacted frequently and wildly to each new report—most 
especially, reports regarding the broad exposure of European banks, 
which are deeply invested in government bonds.
74
 Despite this growing 
                                                          
65 Global Recession, supra note 64; see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 16, at 
1. 
66 Global Recession, supra note 64. 
67 The Stability and Growth Pact is an accord signed by each member state of the Eurozone to 
set national debt and deficit limits that strive to “maintain budget discipline in order to avoid 
excessive deficits.” Stability and Growth Pact and Economic Policy Coordination, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/stability_and_growth_pact/
index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2011); Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and 
Growth Pact, 1997 O.J. (C 236), available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ 
economic_and_monetary_affairs/stability_and_growth_pact/l25021_en.htm; see also European 
Report, BLOOMBERG LAW, Sept. 9, 2011, www.bloomberglaw.com (“The pact was shown to be 
ineffective when the crisis hit, as more than 20 member states were found to be running too-high 
budget shortfalls.”). 
68 Global Recession, supra note 64 (noting that European leaders were forced to respond to 
concerns about Italy and Spain through intervening in the market because many see these countries 
as “too big to bail out”). 
69 Global Recession, supra note 64. 
70 The Plan to Have a Plan: Solving the Euro-zone Crisis, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011, 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/BCRC?vrsn=unknown&locID=nysl_me_brooklaw&srchtp=adv
&c=1&ste=31&tbst=tsVS&tab=2&RNN=A268890969&docNum=A268890969&bConts=2 
[hereinafter The Plan to Have a Plan]. 
71 In fact, large financial institutions are beginning to lose confidence that the euro will survive 
this crisis and are preparing for the worst. Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the 
Euro, supra note 5. 
72 Global Recession, supra note 64 (“Protests by traditional interest groups like public sector 
unions were joined by crowds of young people who camped out in Madrid and Athens in imitation 
of the Arab Spring demonstrations.”). 
73 Global Recession, supra note 64 (noting that harsh austerity measures have led to the “ouster 
of governments in Ireland and Portugal, dragging the government of Greece to the brink and 
weakening the ruling party in Spain”); In order to implement the measures adopted in the Statement, 
both Greece and Italy removed the ruling government and new leaders are charged with the 
responsibility of implementing these new economic reforms. See Guy Dinmore & Giulia Segreti, 
Italian Vote Paves the Way for Berlusconi Exit, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b4217efa-0d52-11e1-a47c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dWWCa4aP. 
74 Global Recession, supra note 64 (discussing the concerns about bank exposure, which arose 
in October of 2011, but remain precarious into December. For example, on December 21, 2011 the 
European Central Bank issued “cheap three-year loans” totaling almost a half a trillion euros “as part 
of its unprecedented effort to keep credit flowing.”). 
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volatility, “Europe's progress [was] hampered by the usual mixture of 
public bickering and behind-the-scenes brinkmanship.”75 Finally, in 
October 2011, the Euro Summit met in Brussels with all eyes and ears 
attentively waiting for a deal, for a solution, for any hope that the 
policymakers could collectively act to stop the growing crisis in Greece 
and contain the problem.
76
 
B.  The Euro Summit Statement: Greece’s Bailout Compromise 
The Euro Summit, a meeting of fiscal policy leaders from all 
seventeen Eurozone member states, agreed to a set of compromises set 
forth in the Euro Summit Statement.
77
 The Summit had two main 
objectives: (1) immediate aid to Greece, and (2) prevent the spread of 
the crisis, or limit the expansion of the crisis to other “at risk” nations.78 
The Statement attempted to accomplish those objectives with the 
following: 
Greek Provisions 
Greece: Will reduce its public debt to GDP ratio to 
120% by 2020 and introduce austerity measures to 
accomplish this goal;
 79
 
European Banks: Will accept a 50% loss on the face 
value of all Greek debt
80
 and will raise $147 billion in 
new capital by the end of June 2011 to protect 
themselves against losses on loans to Greece and 
Portugal;
81
 
                                                          
75 The Plan to Have a Plan, supra note 70. 
76 Liz Alderman, Europeans Struggle Towards Debt Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/business/global/europeans-struggle-toward-debt-
solution.html?_r=1&ref=world. To be fair, the U.S. policymakers have been similarly unable to 
respond to the debt ceiling debate and reforms therein. While this does not justify the inaction by 
either set of policymakers, it does note a common tension between prudent financial reform and 
politics (e.g. re-election concerns). 
77 See generally Euro Summit Statement, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
78 See generally Euro Summit Statement, supra  note 1, at 1; Alderman, Europeans Struggle 
towards Debt Solution, supra note 76; see Main Results of Euro Summit, Euro Summit (Oct. 26, 
2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ 125645.pdf (“These 
measures reflect our unwavering determination to overcome together the current difficulties and to 
take all the necessary steps towards a deeper economic union commensurate with our monetary 
union.”). 
79 Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at 1; see also Frequently Asked Questions: Greece, 
IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/greecefaqs.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2011) 
[hereinafter FAQ: Greece]. 
80 Erlanger & Castle, Europe Agrees to Basics of Plan, supra note 63.  
81 Erlanger & Castle, Europe Agrees to Basics of Plan, supra note 63 (noting that the $147 
billion was set as the target because policymakers believe it is crucial for global confidence that the 
banks “increase their holdings of safe assets to 9 percent of their total capital . . . given their large 
portfolios of sovereign debt.”); The money should be raised from private sources, “including through 
restructuring and conversion of debt to equity instruments.” Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at 
1; In the event this is not possible then the banks may seek support from national governments, or 
the ESFS as a last resort. Id; Banks are also required to constrain distribution of dividends and bonus 
payments until the target of 9% is achieved. Id. at 15.  
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW      VOLUME 9 
11 
 
Eurozone member states: Will contribute to the 
private sector involvement (PSI) package with up to 30 
billion euros;
82
  
IMF: Will provide additional aid to Greece under the 
“EU-IMF multiannual program for Greece,” which will 
be put in place at the end of 2011, [and] will finance up 
to 100 billion euros”;83  
All Parties: Will work to develop a strong legislative 
package within the E.U. structure to create a better 
system of economic governance.
84
 
Long-Term Eurozone Crisis Measures:  
Stronger European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF): Will leverage its 440 billion euro fund 4 or 5 
fold to build a 1 trillion euro “‘firewall’ against 
contagion from the debt crisis.”85 The leveraging 
measure will increase the funds available to countries in 
crisis without extending the guarantees already provided 
by member states;
86
 
European Nations: Will, if necessary, “provide 
guarantees to the banks (the criteria and conditions for 
such guarantees will be coordinated at EU level) to 
facilitate their access to medium-term funding”  in order 
to “avoid a credit crunch[;]”87 
Member states: Will agree to greater E.U. oversight 
and coordination of future fiscal planning in member 
state financial decision-making and crisis response 
mechanisms.
88
   
                                                          
82 Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 1. 
83 Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 1; see also FAQ: Greece, supra note 79 
(“On May 9, 2010, the IMF's Executive Board approved a three-year SDR 26.4 billion (€30 billion) 
Stand-By Arrangement for Greece in support of the authorities’ economic adjustment and 
transformation program.”). 
84 Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 2 (determining that greater coordination 
of fiscal policy will occur at the “EU level” even “before national decisions are taken”).  
85 Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 2. 
86 Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 2. The Statement is not entirely clear 
how the EFSF will be leveraged and if this will, in fact, create a sustainable “firewall.” For a 
discussion of the various possibilities see Stephen Fidler, EFSF Leverage: A Rundown on Ways to 
Bulk up the Euro Zone’s Bailout Fund, WALL ST. J. (REAL TIME BRUSSELS BLOG) (Sept. 27, 2011, 
2:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2011/09/27/efsf-leverage-a-rundown; Stephen Fidler, Don’t 
Believe New EFSF Number, WALL ST. J. (REAL TIME BRUSSELS BLOG) (Oct. 26, 2011, 8:02 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2011/10/26/dont-believe-new-efsf-number. 
87 Way Out of the Debt Crisis, EUR. COUNCIL, http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-
page/highlights/way-out-of-the-debt-crisis.aspx?lang=en (last visited Dec. 10, 2011). 
88 Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at 7–9; The implementation of these coordination 
mechanisms will require treaty revisions setting forth the steps by which fiscal decisions will be 
made and to ensure compliance with and enforcement of these decisions. See id; The first steps of 
these treaty revisions were initiated at the Euro Summit held from December 8–9. See Steven 
Erlanger & Stephen Castle, German Vision Prevails as Leaders Agree on Fiscal Pact, N.Y. TIMES, 
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As a cohesive response to the current crisis and a call to action to 
assist in debt-alleviation, the Statement has largely met the goals of its 
drafters.
89
 However, as a long-term sovereign debt crisis response 
mechanism, the Statement is not effective.
90
 The Statement is only an ad 
hoc response, which relies on all members of the Eurozone to finance an 
expensive bailout scheme. Imposing austerity measures while 
simultaneously building a “firewall,” the measures are as inconsistent as 
they are burdensome. In addition, these commitments impose a heavy 
burden on E.U. member states both financially and politically.
91
 As a 
result, the Statement, and the subsequent actions thereto, have tested the 
bonds between E.U. states and the euro experiment itself.
92
 In addition, 
the Statement neglects the long history of sovereign debt crises, which 
have arisen despite “sound macroeconomic policies.”93 Europe has dealt 
with a symptom, but it has failed to address the true problem—the 
absence of a clear sovereign debt-restructuring framework. In the event a 
European nation fails to uphold its austerity and debt restriction 
commitments under the Statement, and/or the future treaty provisions 
written to implement the Statement provisions, the European Union will 
need an orderly mechanism to address this problem, or, potentially, face 
the Union’s demise.94 
IV.   A CRISIS RELIEF VALVE: THE EUROPEAN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
FRAMEWORK (“EDRF”) 
As the global financial leaders grasp at straws to implement the ad 
hoc solution set forth in the Statement, a mechanism for debt 
restructuring is, and has been, available all along: the SDRM. SDRM 
was specifically developed to assist sovereign-debtors.
95
 Its drafters 
included some of the world’s foremost economists.96 Therefore, even 
though the IMF formally removed the SDRM from consideration, the 
                                                                                                                                  
Dec. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/business/ global/european-leaders-agree-on-
fiscal-treaty.html. 
89 Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at 1. 
90 The Statement has failed to elevate the crisis in Greece. Greece has failed to meet its 
obligations under the terms of the Statement and has required further bailout money. Donahue, supra 
note 3; Thomas, Greece May Need New Tactics, supra note 11; see also Euro Summit Statement, 
supra note 1, at 9 (stating that the new structure of fiscal governance through the E.U. will “rely on a 
stronger preparatory structure”). 
91 Thomas, Greece May Need New Tactics, supra note 11 (“Greece, in essence, has become a 
financial ward of Europe. And, because the I.M.F. will probably be reluctant to put in new bailout 
money in the coming years, the burden will increasingly fall to Europe, led by Germany, to finance 
Greece.”) 
92 See Erlanger & Castle, German Vision Prevails, supra note 88. 
93 Creating a broad “preparatory structure” is an insufficient response to this reoccurring 
problem, which has colossal effects on the global economy. See Buckley, supra note 17, at 1193–94 
(quoting Laurence Meyer, Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System)(“[S]ound 
macroeconomic policies do not preclude crises.”).  
94 See Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the Euro, supra note 5. 
95 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 2. 
96 See, e.g., KRUEGER, supra note 9, at v. 
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mechanism should be revived to serve as a model—allowing 
policymakers to adopt the positive elements and reform the negative ones 
to accommodate Europe’s particular needs, creating a “new and 
improved” EDRF. The EDRF would provide a systematic and 
predictable structure for all parties to engage in negotiations and produce 
a restructuring plan.
97
 In light of the current debt crisis and the unique 
regional cooperation required by the euro, the E.U. has the opportunity to 
build on the principles set forth in the SDRM and to create a viable 
framework for sovereign debt restructuring.  
A.  Building the Framework for Negotiations 
Creating a new framework for parties to engage in a structure 
negotiation requires both an administrative and a legal infrastructure.  
For the administrative component, the EDRF needs a venue with 
financial investigative resources and economic experts available to 
facilitate the negotiations. The European Court of Auditors (ECA), with 
the power and the resources to investigate any persons or organization 
using E.U. funds, would serve this function.
98
 When a crisis presents 
itself, the EDRF can function as a division within the ECA dedicated to 
administrating EDRF negotiations. These negotiations will operate 
within an E.U.-created statutory framework,
99
 creating predictability and 
ensuring equitable treatment of all parties. The framework would be 
adopted through an E.U. resolution, which is immediately binding and 
non-waivable for all E.U. member states and written into a universal 
treaty, which will ideally function to expand the scope of authority 
beyond the European Union to reach the global community of sovereign 
debt creditors. Together, the administrative and legal infrastructures 
create the foundation necessary to build a new structure. 
1. Finding a Venue 
The ECA with its professional E.U. auditors (Auditors) and access to 
tools for comprehensive investigative economic research is the natural 
institution to house the EDRF. Including the EDRF within the ECA 
would streamline E.U. resources used to support the negotiations and 
investigations. The ECA is empowered to investigate the use of E.U. 
funds through audits and to provide an annual report on the E.U’s 
                                                          
97 See, e.g., GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 4 (proposing a similar structural reform of SDRM to 
create: “A procedure to initiate and conduct negotiations between a sovereign-debtor with 
unsustainable debt and its creditors leading to, and enforcing, an agreement on how to reduce the 
present value of the debtor’s future obligations in order to reestablish the sustainability of its public 
finances.”). 
98 European Court of Auditors, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-
auditors/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). Cf. GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 4 (proposing the use 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union as the “natural institution for this purpose”). 
99 See Skeel, supra note 58, at 422–24. 
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financial status to the European Parliament.
100
 Therefore, the ECA is the 
E.U. administrative body most well informed about the use, and abuse, 
of E.U. finances. The Auditors, representing each E.U. member state, are 
charged with inspecting “E.U. institutions, member countries and 
countries receiving E.U. aid,”101 and “any persons or organization 
handling E.U. funds,” whose inspection findings are reported to the 
European Commission and the E.U. national governments.
102
 Therefore, 
the Auditors have unique professional and institutional knowledge and 
are in the best position to oversee the EDRF. With the approval of the 
nation-states, the Auditors would facilitate the progress of negotiations 
by ensuring that the framework of rules is observed. 
2. Establishing Authority 
 
The statutory framework governing the use of the EDRF would be 
passed as an E.U. regulation, a legislative act immediately binding on all 
E.U. members.
103
 A uniform law would compel all E.U. member states, 
those that have adopted the euro and those that have not, to recognize the 
EDRF and to abide by its provisions.
 104
 Under the law’s terms, any E.U. 
member state would have access to EDRF relief. In return, all member 
states, including their corporations and citizens, would be bound through 
a non-waivable provision to support the framework’s operation, either as 
parties to the negotiation, as creditors, or as financiers of the 
restructuring plan (as EFSF guarantors).
105
 While expanding the scope of 
the EDRF beyond the Eurozone will provide a greater body of 
participants, the restructuring of a sovereign’s debt will require the 
participation of a global community of creditors—some of whom may 
fall outside the E.U.’s regulatory authority. Therefore, additional steps 
must be taken to bind this global creditor community—international 
corporations, financial institutions, hedge funds and/or individual 
investors.  
                                                          
100 European Court of Auditors, supra note 98. 
101 European Court of Auditors, supra note 98. 
102 European Court of Auditors, supra note 98. 
103 This would bind some nations, like the U.K., that are not currently members of the 
Eurozone. However, fluctuations in the euro create distress in non-euro nations. It would be to the 
benefit of these nations to have a place at the table or involvement in the negotiations. It seems these 
nations desire to use their current fiscal position to exert greater control over the E.U. and this 
legislation may be one such tool to exert that power. See Euro Crisis Opportunity for UK to Reclaim 
Powers, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15730084; However, 
the U.K. has consistently been reluctant to adopt any fiscally restrictive provisions. See e.g., Erlanger 
& Castle, German Vision Prevails, supra note 88. 
104 See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 33 (discussing the benefits of creating a statutory scheme 
rather than a series of contracts as proposed under the CAC system). 
105 About EFSF, EUR. FIN. STABILITY FACILITY, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm 
(last visited Dec. 11, 2011) (“EFSF is backed by guarantee commitments from the euro area Member 
States for a total of €780 billion and has a lending capacity of €440 billion.”). 
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In order to compel recognition by the global community of creditors, 
a universal treaty should be adopted.
106
 The treaty’s terms would outline 
the process required for the EDRF negotiation and thereby establish the 
legitimacy, and ideally the universal recognition, of the EDRF 
negotiations and its negotiated plan. The treaty can follow the Model 
Law’s format on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law) promulgated by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITL), 
which was drafted “to formulate a modern, harmonized and fair 
legislative framework to address more effectively instances of cross-
border insolvency.”107 Similar to the Model Law, all parties to the treaty 
would agree to cooperate, and compel their citizens, both private 
individuals and corporations, to cooperate with a pending EDRF 
negotiation.
108
 Once the negotiation is complete and a plan is in place, 
the treaty would require “automatic recognition and enforceability” of 
the plan in other member states.
109
 Not only will the treaty ensure all 
necessary parties engage in the negotiations, but also, it will prevent 
derivative litigation actions and ensure the finality of the restructuring 
plan.
110
  
While the treaty provides a convenient vehicle for universal 
recognition, there is a potential drawback to this method: requiring 
sovereign nations to sign a binding treaty.
111
 Unlike the SDRM that 
failed to gain support from individual nations, the EDRF is a more 
palatable option for restructuring, especially in the context of the current 
crisis. The treaty will ask nations to honor Europe’s new framework, 
essentially a formal agreement to ensure the observance of the customary 
international law principle of “comity.”112 This commitment is similar to 
that required by the Model Law, which has been adopted into the 
statutory laws of eighteen nations, including the United States, the 
European Union, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand.
113
 It is reasonable 
                                                          
106 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 33. 
107 U.N. Secretariat, Draft Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Legislative Provision 
on Cross-Border Insolvency, Note by the Secretariat, 30th Sess., May 12–30, 1997, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/436 (Apr. 16, 1997); See also Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998), available at http://www.cnudci.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts 
/insolvency/1997Model.html [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. 
108 See, e.g., id. pmbl.  
109 See, e.g., id. art. 25; see also Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 17(1), Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000 (EC), available at 
http://www.guildhallchambers.co.uk/uploads/docs/section9/Cross-
borderInsolvencyIssues_SPR&GMcPhie.pdf.  
110 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, pmbl; see also KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 15. 
111 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 32. 
112 In the absence of a formal treaty, the principle of comity would require that other nations 
respect the laws of the E.U.—here the reach of the EDRF. While this principle may accomplish 
many of the same goals as the treaty, the treaty is a more clear and effective compliance tool.   
113 The Model Law has been adopted by: Australia, Canada, Columbia, Eritrea, Greece, Japan, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States. See Status, UNCITRAL, http://www.cnudci.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/ 
1997Model_status.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
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to conclude that a treaty addressing cross-border restructuring would 
attract at least the same number, and hopefully, more, parties as a Model 
Law for cross-border insolvency proceedings. Many of the same interests 
for cross-border harmonization in administering a debtor’s international 
assets and debts are present in both circumstances. In addition, the 
present crisis has demonstrated the intensely sensitive and interconnected 
nature of the modern global economy.
114
 Where the SDRM asked for 
international support for reform after the crisis in emerging Latin 
American and East Asian nations, here the EDRF arises as a response to 
a crisis that is shaking the foundations of the Group of Ten. If the EDRF 
can return calm to the markets and allow for future growth, then it is not 
unreasonable to assume nations will sign its formational treaty. 
Even if some or all sovereign parties are reluctant to sign the treaty, 
individual creditors have a financial interest in participating in the 
negotiations in order to receive some return on their investment. Upon 
the conclusion of the negotiations and adoption of a plan, all creditors 
and sovereign parties would be bound by the mutually agreed upon 
terms. The EDRF terms will ensure the sovereign-debtors are not subject 
to subsequent litigation to re-negotiate these terms. This will protect the 
plan’s finality and encourage greater participation of all relevant parties. 
B.  The Rules of Engagement 
The EDRF will guide the sovereign-debtor
115
 and its creditors through 
a negotiation with the goal of developing a restructuring plan that is in 
the best interests of all parties. The plan will ensure debts are repaid in an 
amount and within a timeframe that is reasonable to creditors, but also 
protects the potential for future growth and stability of the nation. While 
each EDRF negotiation will be tailored to meet the needs of the 
particular sovereign-debtor and its creditors, the statutory framework will 
set the “rules of engagement.”116 The EDRF rules will begin with a 
threshold inquiry. The threshold rules will define “who” may use the 
EDRF and obtain relief as a sovereign-debtor. To ensure EDRF 
resources are used efficiently and preserve the stability of the market for 
sovereign bonds, only eligible debtors should be able to use the resources 
of the EDRF and obtain restructuring relief from creditors. The Auditors, 
in their administrative role, will oversee this process to ensure the 
threshold requirements are met. Once a debtor is accepted into the 
EDRF, the rules will define the procedures for the negotiation. The main 
                                                          
114 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 32–33; see supra Part III. 
115 Following the principles of Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which allows 
municipalities to declare bankruptcy, the sovereign-debtor would remain in power to use and sell 
property or to borrow funds through the pendency of the negotiations. See e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 903, 
904; Buckley, supra note 17, at 1205–06 (“Perhaps the most important section of Chapter 9 from the 
point of view of its applicability to services is section 904 . . . The debtor can therefore go about its 
day-to-day activities and borrow money without recourse to the court.”). 
116 The EDRF rules will use Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Chapter 9”) as a loose 
model. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109. 
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principles, following the SDRF model, will include: (1) majority 
restructuring, (2) adequate assurances for creditors, and (3) priority 
financing.
117
 Together, these threshold and fundamental protocols will 
create a framework for restructuring sovereign debt that provides 
efficient and effective relief to sovereign-debtors and ensures the 
equitable treatment of creditors.  
1. Who is a Sovereign-Debtor?: The Threshold Inquiry 
 
The scope of the EDRF must be clearly defined through a threshold 
inquiry. The inquiry will ensure only “sovereign-debtors” have access to 
EDRF. Therefore, the first step of the threshold analysis is defining “who 
is a sovereign-debtor” with a set of identifiable criteria. Only those 
debtors who meet these criteria would be eligible to engage in EDRF 
negotiations and obtain relief. As the administrator of the negotiations, 
the Auditor will apply the criteria and engage in the threshold inquiry.
 
The Auditor will ask two questions:  
1. Is the potential sovereign-debtor an E.U. member           
state?
118 
2. Has the potential sovereign-debtor previously 
attempted to negotiate with creditors in good 
faith?
119
 
The first question for the threshold inquiry is whether the potential 
debtor is an E.U. member. An eligible debtor must be a sovereign-nation, 
who has been accepted as an E.U. member.
120
 This requirement is 
necessary on jurisdictional and financial grounds. First, the EDRF would 
be formed pursuant to an E.U. Regulation, which is immediately binding 
on all E.U. members. Therefore, each member state would be bound to 
accept the EDRF as a legitimate debt relief framework. In addition, the 
EDRF would be financed by E.U. funds and supported by the EFSF. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to limit the use of this tool to those who 
support its existence both in theory and in fiscal reality.  
The remaining threshold requirement is that the sovereign-debtor 
must attempt to negotiate in good faith with creditors.
121
 This 
requirement partially arises from the CAC approach. The prevalence of 
CACs in bond contracts means that nations have the opportunity to 
negotiate with creditors in specific bond issuances.
122
 When the 
                                                          
117 See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
118 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 109(41). 
119 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B). 
120 For more information on which nations are members of the E.U., which nations have 
applied for membership, and the criteria for obtaining membership in the E.U., see Countries, 
EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2011). 
121 The requirement of negotiating in good faith also arises in Chapter 9. See 11 U.S.C. § 
109(c)(4). 
122 See supra Part II.B.  
WINTER 2012                                             AS GREECE GOES, SO GOES THE E.U.       
18 
 
sovereign realizes its debts are unserviceable, it must exercise due 
diligence and attempt to exercise its CACs and negotiate with creditors. 
Only after these negotiations have failed, or individual CAC negotiations 
have been clearly insufficient, can the sovereign exercise the EDRF.  
The goal of the “prior negotiations” inquiry is to limit the use of 
EDRF to only good faith sovereign-debtors. Therefore, the framework 
must strike a balance between encouraging sovereigns with 
“unsustainable debts to approach its creditors promptly”123 on the one 
hand, and limiting the preemptive use of the restructuring framework by 
“countries with sustainable debts to suspend payments rather than make 
necessary adjustments to their economic policies”124 on the other. In 
applying this standard, the Auditors will review the proof of prior 
attempts to engage in good faith negotiations. Evidence, at a minimum, 
should include an affidavit from the Secretary of Treasury attesting to the 
existence of such a meeting, evidence of a drafted “term sheet” for such a 
negotiation proposal, or financial reports demonstrating the futility of 
individual CAC negotiations. A sovereign-debtor that is an E.U. member 
and a good faith debtor under the terms of the EDRF framework will be 
able to proceed to negotiate with its creditors and draft a restructuring 
plan. 
2. Framing the Negotiations 
 
A simple and clear set of provisions will govern the restructuring 
negotiations. As originally set forth by the IMF, the predictability of the 
framework will be important to protect the stability of global financial 
markets and ensure the participation of each party.
125
 The main 
provisions adapted for the SDRM remain applicable in the EDRF 
context: (1) majority restructuring; (2) protect creditor interests with 
“adequate assurances”; and (3) priority financing. 
Majority restructuring, a provision central to both SDRM and CAC 
approaches, allows an “affirmative vote of a qualified majority of 
creditors to bind a dissenting minority to the terms of a restructuring” 
plan.
126
 This prohibits a minority group of holdout creditors from 
preventing a deal or from acting as a “hold out,” attempting to extract 
more benefits as a condition of agreeing to the plan.
127
 Therefore, 
majority restructuring creates party equity and preserves the value of the 
assets financing the plan.
128
 Adopting the SDRM statutory framework on 
top of the contractual CAC clauses, allows EDRF to overcome the 
                                                          
123 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 4. 
124 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 2.  
125 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
126 KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 14. 
127 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 24. The parties may also consider exercising a “most favored 
nation” technique, which would allow the hold out creditors to separately negotiate an alternative 
plan, adopt the most favorable plan, and share the benefits among all parties.   
128 See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 14. 
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CAC’s aggregation problem and engage in total debt, rather than just 
bond-specific, negotiations. All creditors would be included in the 
negotiations, and if necessary would be grouped into committees of like-
debt holders, such as bond debt holders, bank claims, and domestic 
debt.
129
 A majority vote of all creditors, or creditors’ committees, would 
bind all parties to adopt the restructuring plan.
130
 The EDRF majority 
restructuring would ensure all classes of creditors are at the negotiation 
table, which streamlines the negotiations and plan approval process and 
eliminates “disruptive litigation” by binding all parties through the 
majority vote.
131
 
The EDRF will include adequate assurances to protect creditors’ 
financial interests and incentivize creditors to engage in the negotiations. 
Adequate assurances may include certain promises, such as the 
sovereign-debtor will make
 
 no payments to “non-priority creditors” or 
will “conduct policies in a fashion that preserves asset values” and 
certain structural insurances, such as restrictions on future relief through 
EDRF.
132
 However, creditors may fear that the sovereign-debtor will 
return to “business as usual” and fail to honor its promises after the plan 
has been approved. Therefore, this provision may require additional 
negotiations to arrive at an agreed upon set of transparency or leadership 
transition measures.  
While financial transparency and oversight might approach the 
sensitive line of sovereignty, it is not an unreasonable imposition. Unlike 
the SDRM, which empowered the IMF to act as the overseer, here the 
ECA, an E.U. regional institution with personnel representing each E.U. 
member state, is employed for this purpose. At a basic level, it may seem 
less invasive, and thereby more palatable for sovereign-debtors, if an 
E.U. institution is observing the fiscal policy of an E.U. member state. In 
addition, Auditors are already empowered to investigate the use of E.U. 
funds.
133
 Since most EDRF plans will include EFSF financing, the 
Auditors would be acting within the scope of their authority under the 
ECA. Finally, the parties to the EDRF have the flexibility to define the 
level of transparency and depth of Auditor review.
134
  Therefore, on a 
balance sheet basis, the terms can be written to protect the sovereign 
                                                          
129 Creditor committees are commonly used in bankruptcy reorganizations governed by 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103; see also Chapter 11, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 11, 2011). 
130 See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 15. 
131 See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 15. 
132 See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 16. 
133 European Court of Auditors, supra note 98. 
134 Currently, Italy has entered into such an observation agreement with the IMF as part of its 
commitment to uphold the requirements set forth in the Euro Summit Statement. In the event that a 
nation, such as Italy, has been unable to or reluctant to make necessary fiscal changes, this type of 
observation would be necessary for a successful restructuring. See, e.g., Liz Alderman, Italy Agrees 
to Allow I.M.F. to Monitor its Progress on Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/world/europe/italy-agrees-to-imf-oversight.html [hereinafter 
Alderman, Italy]. 
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interests of the debtor, while also providing an extra layer of 
accountability for the creditors. 
Finally, a successful restructuring requires new capital to finance on-
going expenses and necessary future expenditures. This funding can 
come from two sources: (1) EFSF bailout funding, as currently provided 
under the Statement, or (2) creditors. To induce creditors to provide 
funds or fresh capital, the EDRF must offer the creditor priority 
financing, which ensures senior status in repayment.
135
 Therefore, all 
parties give and take: the sovereign-debtor promises priority financing 
and receives fresh capital; the creditor offers new funds and receives 
priority repayment. As originally stated in the SDRM proposal, “[i]t is in 
the collective interests of private creditors and the sovereign-debtor that 
new money be provided in appropriate amounts.”136  Fresh capital allows 
the nation to continue to finance the restructuring plan, but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, to fulfill its governance obligations and ensure 
the availability of its social net for its citizens.
137
 Priority financing 
provides incentives to both parties at the negotiation table and helps 
ensure the plan will be effective in the long term. 
3. “The Plan” 
 
The purpose of the EDRF is to negotiate a restructuring plan that the 
sovereign-debtor and a majority of creditors can agree upon and maintain 
through completion. Unlike the acceptance of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
plan, where the plan must meet criteria set forth in the Bankruptcy Code 
and must be approved by the bankruptcy judge,
138
 here the goal is to 
reach a consensus agreement, without court involvement, through the 
EDRF structured negotiations. While the EDRF frames the rules for the 
negotiations, additional incentives or penalties, i.e., carrot or stick, 
measures, may be necessary to encourage parties to engage the 
                                                          
135 See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 17. 
136 See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 17. 
137 A sovereign-debtor is in a unique position with the responsibility to provide for the well-
being of its citizens, in addition to its commitments to repay its creditors. It is important that a plan 
include both spending restrictions, i.e. austerity measures, but also, sufficient fresh capital to protect 
citizens relying on government support and services. The conflict between austerity reforms and 
social safety net spending is discussed in a variety of news and human rights publications. See, e.g., 
Nicholas Kulish, Euro Crisis Pits Germany and U.S. in Tactical Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/euro-crisis-pits-germany-and-us-in-tactical-
fight.html?src=un&feedurl=http%3A%2F%2Fjson8.nytimes.com%2Fpages%2Fbusiness%2Fglobal
%2Findex.json (noting the conflict between Germany’s push for austerity and economists’ concerns 
that “forcing austerity plans on Europe’s troubled economies — while a good long-term solution — 
could lead to deep recessions in the short term, compromising any chance for effective change”); 
The Austerity Zone: Life in the New Europe, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2010/09/23/business/global/20100923-europenow.html?ref=europeansovereigndebtcrisis#/1 (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2011) (an interactive feature article interviewing citizens across the E.U.). 
138 See 11 U.S.C. 943(b)(7) (the plan must both be in the best interests of the creditors and 
feasible). 
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framework and reach a consensus.
139
 These components, as seen in the 
Euro Summit Statement, will include:  
1. New Financing: Debtor access to bailout funds from the 
EFSF and availability of priority financing from 
creditors; 
 
2. Haircuts: Agreement that creditors will reduce their 
total outstanding debt amount to be paid by the debtor; 
 
3. Adequate Assurances & Reform: Promises from the 
sovereign-debtor to protect the remaining assets to 
ensure creditors are paid back in accordance with the 
new restructuring plan, which terms would be agreed 
upon as part of the negotiations. Upon adoption of the 
plan, the sovereign debtor would not be eligible to obtain 
relief or enter negotiations under EDRF for a period of 
ten (10) years.  
These carrot and stick options are reciprocal arrangements that are 
chosen by the parties as part of the negotiations. For example, creditors 
providing new financing will be privileged with senior status for 
repayment, and creditors willing to accept a haircut can reciprocally 
demand adequate assurances—with the option to have the Auditors 
oversee compliance. These options are not rules to be drafted into the 
terms of the EDRF statutory framework. Instead, the carrot/stick options 
are extra tools, which can be used by negotiators in drafting a plan.  
New money, debt discounts, and compliance were all options used in 
drafting the Statement. However, unlike the prolonged negotiations, 
which produced the Statement, the EDRF has a statutory framework to 
ensure the efficient administration of the negotiations. In addition, these 
rules will also ensure that only those parties necessary to the 
restructuring are allowed to participate in negotiations– i.e. the 
sovereign-debtor and its creditors.
140
 Where the Euro Summit invited all 
Eurozone leaders to negotiate a solution for Greece and the other 
precariously positioned European states, the EDRF would ask the 
sovereign-debtor to take the lead. Streamlining the procedure and 
restricting participation provides efficiency in the face of a financial 
crisis.
141
 In addition, these measures empower the carrot and stick 
                                                          
139 See Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al., Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and 
Experimental Perspectives, 47 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 279, 284 (2003) (discussing the use of “carrot-
and-stick measures” to “augment the appeal of [] solutions by adding and subtracting benefits 
to/from the proposed solution”); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract 
Transition in the Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691, 734 n.206, 734–36 (2004). 
140 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 25–26 (discussing the importance of limiting negotiations to 
the relevant parties so the restructuring does not become a “de-facto international negotiation 
involving states”). 
141 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 10 (“The lessons from the 2010 crisis, however, are that it 
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options since each party at the table will be impacted by their use or 
disuse. Together, the EDRF framework for negotiations and the carrot 
and stick options will allow the parties to reach a restructuring plan, 
which protects the interests of creditors and ensures the long-term 
viability of the sovereign-debtor.   
V.   TAKING A LEAP TO SAVE THE EURO 
Learning from the mistakes of the SDRM and CAC approaches, and 
inefficiencies of the Statement, the EDRF can serve as a viable 
framework to address future sovereign debt crises. Using the ECA 
infrastructure, the professional knowledge of the Auditors, and EFSF 
financing maintains European authority over a European issue. Whereas 
SDRM invited the involvement of the IMF, here the E.U. can resolve a 
member state’s debt crisis using the regional infrastructure that is already 
in place.
142
 Employing a statutory framework would ensure the EDRF 
can invoke the participation of all classes of bond holders and all types of 
creditors, thereby avoiding the CAC’s aggregation problem.143 Finally, 
EDRF reduces the burden imposed on E.U. members by the terms of the 
current Statement in two ways. First, the EDRF statutory framework sets 
forth guidelines for negotiations. A clear and predictable structure avoids 
wasting time and resources developing an ad hoc solution.
144
 Second, 
EDRF helps the relevant parties arrive at a sustainable restructuring plan, 
rather than forcing the E.U. member states to fund an expensive and 
extensive bailout plan.
145
 While the EFSF bailout funds and fresh capital 
from creditors would be available to incentivize further negotiations, 
these funds are part of a package deal, not the only game in town. While 
the proposed EDRF structure has many benefits and overcomes the 
obstacles faced by prior proposals, there remain potential critics and 
criticisms.  
First, critics may fear that the availability of a restructuring scheme 
will send a negative signal to investors, and potentially, undermine the 
European bond market. This is a reasonable concern, but empirical 
evidence of the impact is difficult to quantify.
146
 When CACs were first 
proposed, similar concerns were expressed. But those concerns were 
                                                                                                                                  
can take a long time to reach an agreement and that delays involve costs: while policymakers 
negotiate, markets speculate about the probability, nature and depth of a compromise. To rely once 
again on improvisation to find a solution would involve significant risks for the stability of the euro 
area.”). 
142 See also GIANVITI, supra note 6 at 28–30. 
143 See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text; see also Galvis & Saad, supra note 36, at 
722. 
144 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 10 (discussing the costs which arise in the absence of a clear 
solution for a financially troubled nation and noting that “[t]o rely once again on improvisation to 
find a solution would involve significant risks for the stability of the euro area.”). 
145 While the European leaders have sought support from the BRIC countries, and further 
funding from the IMF, these efforts have proved unsuccessful. See Alderman, Italy, supra note 134. 
146 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 34. 
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proven unnecessary when Mexico introduced the “first New York-law, 
SEC-registered bond to include CACs in February 2003 (U.S. $1 billion, 
6.625% global notes due 2015).”147 Now, CAC clauses are common 
clauses in all bond issuances. In fact, “[i]t is also safe to assume that the 
market will question the motivation of any issuer that does not adopt 
CACs.”148 Similarly, the inclusion of a bankruptcy clause in a contract, 
either consumer or corporate, is a risk which has been assumed in the 
price of a contract and contract negotiations.
149
 Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that ERDF will follow the same path as its 
predecessors. The change in the legal regime for repayment of sovereign 
bonds will initially cause a ripple in the markets, but will likely be 
accepted as a measure necessary to ensure greater long-term market 
stability.
150
 In addition, some scholars believe this type of mechanism 
will actually strengthen the sovereign bond market: 
If anything, this evidence suggests that the introduction 
of rules for dealing with sovereign default will 
contribute to the tendency of markets to distinguish 
between high- and low-quality borrowers and to price 
loans and bonds accordingly. This would strengthen 
market discipline and contribute to the goal of 
sustainable public finances laid down in the European 
treaty, and thereby to the sustainability of the euro 
itself.
151
 
While the EDRF may potentially spook the bond market in the short 
term, it is equally, if not more, likely to support the long-term growth and 
sustainability of the euro market. Just as CACs and bankruptcy arose 
despite market concerns, the EDRF can provide greater security if 
adopted.  
Second, like the SDRM, the EDRF would require certain sacrifices of 
sovereignty. While this remains a large obstacle, the E.U. and the euro 
itself, are products of fiscal policy coordination and subordination to a 
centralized institution.
152
 Therefore E.U. member states, especially the 
members that adopted the euro, have already agreed to a “partial loss of 
                                                          
147 Gray, supra note 39, at 698; see also id. at 699 (“The favourable reaction to Mexico's bond 
reflected in large part the market judgement [sic] that Mexico and its advisers had achieved an 
equitable balance between its interests and those of the bondholder community. Mexico's initiative 
was followed in rapid order with CAC bonds from Brazil, South Africa, Korea, and, of greatest 
interest, Uruguay.”). 
148 Gray, supra note 39, at 699–700. 
149 See Chrystin Ondersma, Undocumented Debtors, 45:3 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 517, 549 
(2012). 
150 GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 34. 
151 GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 34. 
152 See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 22–23 (“Supranationality and partial loss of national 
sovereignty, the fears of which were a major reason for the rejection of the SDRM proposal, are 
therefore part and parcel of the existing EU.”). 
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national sovereignty.”153 In addition, the on-going crisis has reached a 
boiling point where desires for fiscal security might further tip the scales 
in favor of regional solidarity over nationalistic instincts.
154
 At each Euro 
Summit held in response to the crisis, European policymakers have 
reaffirmed their member states’ commitment to the “principle of 
solidarity.”155 In October, as part of the Statement, policymakers drafted 
the “Ten Measures to Improve the Governance of the Euro Area” (the 
Ten Steps). The Ten Steps identified the “need to strengthen economic 
policy coordination and surveillance within the euro area.”156 They also 
set forth a system allowing for centralized fiscal decision-making and 
greater intrusion into member state fiscal policy.
157
 Then in December, 
E.U. leaders moved forward with these Ten Steps by signing an 
intergovernmental treaty. The treaty adopted “structural reforms and 
fiscal consolidation” in order to enhance E.U. fiscal “monitoring and [to 
correct] macroeconomic imbalances.”158 Together, the Ten Steps and the 
treaty indicate a willingness of European policymakers to sacrifice 
components of fiscal sovereignty as a necessary step towards long-term 
fiscal security. On paper and in practice, Europe has moved towards 
greater fiscal unity.
159
 The stability and predictability of an EDRF 
framework would follow as the next step on the path towards greater 
regional fiscal security and future E.U. economic growth.  
Finally, as was the case with SDRM, creditors may worry that EDRF 
will create a “moral hazard problem,” whereby debtors will strategically 
exercise EDRF to avoid repaying large debts.
160
 Structurally, EDRF 
addresses this concern through the threshold test. Only sovereign-debtors 
who meet the threshold requirements, including the “good faith” inquiry, 
can obtain relief.
161
 This test ensures that opportunistic debtors do not 
abuse the framework. In addition to the EDRF structural safeguards, 
market realities limit the incentive for sovereigns to default. Sovereigns 
rely on the issuance of bonds to raise future capital. If sovereigns 
actively default or preemptively exercise EDRF, this could potentially 
                                                          
153 GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 23. 
154 Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the Euro, supra note 5. 
155 GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 10. 
156 GIANVITI, supra note 6, at annex 1, at 11. 
157 GIANVITI, supra note 6, at annex 1, para. 4, at 12 (“[T]he Eurogroup will ensure ever closer 
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158 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 1–2 (Dec. 9, 2011) available at 
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160 GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 8l; Skeel, supra note 58, at 425. 
161 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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restrict their access to certain types of investor funds.
162
 Therefore, it is 
directly opposed to a sovereign’s fiscal interests to repeatedly or 
strategically fail to pay creditors. Together, the threshold requirements 
and market-reputational concerns preserve the EDRF as a tool only for 
“good faith” sovereign-debtors.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The experiment that began with the creation of the supranational 
entity, the E.U., and evolved further to the adoption of a uniform 
currency, the euro, is on the precipice of disaster. As policymakers draft 
new policies to steer the E.U. away from this danger, they have avoided 
facing the real problem: reoccurring crises of unsustainable sovereign 
debt. Reviving and reforming SDRM to construct a new restructuring 
framework, the EDRF, would establish a uniquely European statutory 
mechanism for qualifying sovereign-debtors to engage in negotiations 
with creditors. Through this supervised, but still deferential framework, 
parties can negotiate a restructuring plan tailored to their particular 
needs—in general, protecting the financial interests of the creditors and 
ensuring the economic stability of the sovereign-nation.  
EDRF is a clear solution, which draws on the lessons learned from 
prior proposals, SDRM and CACs, and resolves the ad hoc confusion of 
the Statement. It also addresses the current debt crisis, and the future 
crises that history has proven will likely occur. The precarious condition 
of the European economy and the uniquely interconnected nature of the 
E.U. put these policymakers in the position to take the leap to allow 
sovereign restructuring. Europe defied principals of sovereignty in 
agreeing to supranational governance first in the creation of the E.U., and 
then in the creation of the euro. Now, Europe must make a swift and 
radical action to preserve that Union and the structural integrity of its 
political and fiscal institutions. European policymakers should take the 
lead in regional solidarity again and pave the way toward sovereign 
crisis-response reform with a revised framework for sovereign debt 
restructuring: the EDRF. 
                                                          
162 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 17, at 10–11; Sachs, supra note 22, at 182. 
